Punase Oktoobri 90. aastapäeval avaldas
Euroopa Välispoliitika Nõukogu (ECFR) põneva raporti teemal "
A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations". Selle otsesteks kokkukirjutajateks on Mark Leonard ja Nicu Popescu, kuid ainet andsid mitmed Euroopa praegused ja endised tipp-poliitikud. Eestist on osalenud selle paberi ettevalmistamisel Mart Laar.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Russia has emerged as the most divisive issue in the European Union since Donald Rumsfeld split the European club into ‘new’ and ‘old’ member states. In the 1990s, EU members found it easy to agree on a common approach to Moscow. They coalesced around a strategy of democratising and westernising a weak and indebted Russia. That strategy is now in tatters. Soaring oil and gas prices have made Russia more powerful, less cooperative and above all less interested in joining the west.
Although the EU has failed to change Russia during the Putin era, Russia has had a big impact on the EU. On energy, it is picking off individual EU member states and signing long-term deals which undermine the core principles of the EU's common strategy. On Kosovo, it is blocking progress at the United Nations. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, Russian efforts have effectively shut the EU out of an area where it wanted to promote political reform, resolve conflicts and forge energy partnerships. And in Ukraine and Moldova, Moscow has worked hard, with some success, to blunt the appeal of the European system.
Russia’s new challenge to the EU runs deeper than the threat of energy cut-offs or blockages in the UN. It is setting itself up as an ideological alternative to the EU, with a different approach to sovereignty, power and world order. Where the European project is founded on the rule of law, Moscow believes that laws are mere expressions of power – and that when the balance of power changes, laws should be changed to reflect it. Russia today is trying to revise the terms of commercial deals with western oil companies, military agreements such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and diplomatic codes of conduct like the Vienna Convention. And it is trying to establish a relationship of ‘asymmetric interdependence’ with the EU. While EU leaders believe that peace and stability are built through interdependence, Russia’s leaders are working to create a situation where the EU needs Russia more than Russia needs the EU, particularly in the energy sector.
The fragmentation of European power
In order to help improve the quality of European debate, the ECFR has conducted a power audit of the EU-Russia relationship, examining the resources available to each side, as well as their respective ability to realise their policy objectives.
Although the EU is a far bigger power than Russia in conventional terms – its population is three and a half times the size of Russia's, its military spending seven times bigger, its economy 15 times the size of Russia’s - Europeans are squandering their most powerful source of leverage: their unity. Contrary to a widespread perception, the divisions between them are much more complex than a split between new and old member states. We have identified five distinct policy approaches to Russia shared by old and new members alike: 'Trojan Horses' (Cyprus and Greece) who often defend Russian interests in the EU system, and are willing to veto common EU positions; 'Strategic Partners' (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) who enjoy a 'special relationship' with Russia which occasionally undermines common EU policies; 'Friendly Pragmatists' (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) who maintain a close relationship with Russia and tend to put their business interests above political goals; 'Frosty Pragmatists' (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) who also focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to speak out against Russian behaviour on human rights or other issues; and 'New Cold Warriors' (Lithuania and Poland) who have an overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU negotiations with Russia.
Broadly speaking, the EU is split between two approaches – and each of the five groups tends towards one of the main policy paradigms. At one end of the spectrum are those who view Russia as a potential partner that can be drawn into the EU’s orbit through a process of 'creeping integration.’ They favour involving Russia in as many institutions as possible and encouraging Russian investment in the EU's energy sector, even if Russia sometimes breaks the rules. At the other end are member states who see and treat Russia as a threat. According to them, Russian expansionism and contempt for democracy must be rolled back through a policy of 'soft containment' that involves excluding Russia from the G8, expanding NATO to include Georgia, supporting anti-Russian regimes in the neighbourhood, building missile shields, developing an ‘Energy NATO’ and excluding Russian investment from the European energy sector.
Neither of these approaches has replaced the 1990s model of ‘democratising Russia.’ Each has obvious drawbacks, making both unpalatable to a majority of EU member states. The first approach would give Russia access to all the benefits of co-operation with the EU without demanding that it abides by stable rules. The other approach - of open hostility - would make it hard for the EU to draw on Russia’s help to tackle a host of common problems in the European neighbourhood and beyond.
The Need for a New Paradigm: Promoting the Rule of Law
Despite EU member states’ different interests, history and geography, there is a chance today to agree on a new and better approach, as it is increasingly clear that the status quo works against the interests of all five groups. To develop a new paradigm for the relationship, Europeans will need to rethink the goals, means and policies that define their relations with Russia.
While the long-term goal should be to have a liberal democratic Russia as a neighbour, a more realistic mid-term goal would be to encourage Russia to respect the rule of law, which would allow it to become a reliable partner. The rule of law is central to the European project, and its weakness in Russia is a concern for all Europeans working there. Russia’s selective application of the law affects businesses who worry about respect of contracts, diplomats who fear breaches of international treaties, human rights activists concerned about authoritarianism, and defence establishments who want to avoid military tensions. An approach based on the rule of law would also have positive echoes within Russian society, where even citizens who have become cynical about the language of democracy are concerned about corruption and the arbitrary exercise of power by the state.
If EU leaders manage to unite around such a common strategy, they will be able to use many points of leverage to reinforce it. This report sets out some of the areas where policymakers could rethink their approach in line with a ‘rule of law paradigm’:
Conditional Engagement with Russia. Proponents of ‘soft containment’ and ‘creeping integration’ debate whether Russia should be excluded from the G8, and whether to block the negotiation of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
Under a ‘rule of law’ approach, the EU would keep Russia engaged in these institutions, but adjust the level of cooperation to Russia’s observance of the spirit and the letter of common rules and agreements. If Moscow drags its feet on G8 commitments and policies, more meetings should be organised on these topics at a junior level under a G7 format - excluding Russia. Similarly, the Union should not be afraid to use the EU-Russia summit and the negotiation of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to highlight issues where Russia is being unhelpful, such as Kosovo and the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova.
Principled Bilateralism. Proponents of ‘creeping integration’ see bilateral relations as a good way to reach out to Russia at a time of tension. Their opponents tend to see such contacts as a kind of betrayal (for example, Polish politicians have described the Nordstream deal as a new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact).
Under the ‘rule of law’ paradigm, the EU should aim for 'principled bilateralism.’ The goal would be to ensure that bilateral contacts between Russia and individual EU member states reinforce rather than undermine common EU objectives. Equally, most member states would value an early warning system which would allow both upcoming crises and upcoming deals to be discussed internally in the Union.
Integrate the Neighbourhood. Member states favouring ‘creeping integration’ want to avoid competition for influence with Russia in Europe’s neighbourhood. On the other hand, countries that favour ‘soft containment’ want the EU to increase its activities in countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus in order to roll back Russian influence.
Under the approach we advocate, the EU would focus on encouraging these countries to adopt European norms and regulations and thus integrate them into the European project. The Union could also invest in electricity interconnections with some neighbouring countries, give them access to the Nabucco pipeline, extend the European Energy Community and seek the full application the energy acquis in Turkey, Ukraine and Moldova. This could lead to the unbundling of energy companies in these states, greater transparency in their energy sectors and, consequently, greater energy security for Europe and fewer possibilities for Russia to use energy as an instrument of foreign policy. Equally, the EU should explore the possibility of giving the Trade Commissioner a mandate to fast-track access to the EU market for selected products in the case of any more politically motivated Russian embargoes such as those imposed on Georgian and Moldovan wines.
Enforce the Law. A ‘creeping integration’ approach focuses on signing agreements with Russia and promoting mutual investments and dialogue in the hope that this will transform the way Russian elites conduct their business and diplomacy. A ‘soft containment' approach would seek to limit interaction with Russia as well as Russian influence inside the EU.
A ‘rule of law’ approach would promote mutual agreements and investments, but be much tougher on their implementation. For example, the European Commission should be given political support to apply competition policy in the energy sector, and to investigate some of the more dubious deals between Russian and EU companies. More generally, the EU should demand the enforcement of the growing number of agreements which have not been implemented – the PCA, the four Common Spaces and the European Energy Charter. Ignoring Russian foot-dragging undermines the very principle of a rules-based relationship with Russia.
Rebalance the Relationship. The EU should neither try to minimise its contact with Russia as proponents of ‘soft containment’ have suggested, nor submit to a relationship skewed in Russia’s favour where dependence is weighted in one direction.
To rebalance the relationship, the EU needs to adopt an internal code of conduct on energy deals and guidelines on long-term contracts and forthcoming mergers. In order to avoid further monopolisation and partitioning of the EU energy market, the European Commission could be granted the right to pre-approve big energy deals on long-term contracts and pipelines concluded between EU and foreign energy companies. The practical goals should be open competition, the rule of law and an integrated and flexible gas market.
The biggest challenge will not be to devise new individual policies, but to strengthen the EU’s most powerful tool for dealing with Russia: unity. The EU has a basic choice to make: either member states continue to pursue bilateral agendas, but ultimately all lose out. Or it can unite – which will require individual member states to make possibly painful concessions – and exercise real influence over the nature of the relationship with Russia.
In order to help achieve this level of unity, the EU could form pioneer groups of member states working out a common strategic assessment and joint action points on key issues such as Ukraine, Central Asia or foreign energy policy. The goal should be to seek, with the help of EU institutions, the widest possible consensus among EU member states for policies that strengthen the rule of law. This will require an effort of persuasion in the case of most member states.
If the EU wants to have Russia as a law-abiding, reliable, and eventually democratic neighbour on a continent where even the last shadows of the Iron Curtain have dispelled, it must build its partnership with Russia on the same foundations that made European integration a success – interdependence based on stable rules, transparency, symmetrical relations and consensus. These foundations will not build themselves. The Union must be much more determined about agreeing rules of engagement with Russia, and then defending them.
Pole ju kuigi suur üllatus, et Riigikogu Euroopa Liidu asjade komisjonil oleks tegemist kas Brüsselis või Luxembourgis. Hea ja pädev Euroopa küsimuste otsustamine rahvuslikul tasandil eeldab väga head ja pidevat teadmist Euroopa Liidu institutsioonides toimuvast.
